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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant Jerry Jeffrey Lynch appeals a prison sentence 
of 168 months and 16 years supervised release imposed 
upon him after conviction by guilty plea to an indictment 
charging drug related offenses on April 2, 1996.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. By letter of January 30, 1998, the Clerk of the Court notified the 
parties in this case that this appeal might be dismissed due to a 
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Specifically, Lynch pleaded guilty to his indictment for 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. S 846, 
distribution of cocaine base and aiding and abetting the 
distribution of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) and 18 
U.S.C. S 2, and distribution of cocaine base and aiding and 
abetting the distribution of cocaine base within 1,000 feet 
of a playground, 21 U.S.C. S 860 and 18 U.S.C.S 2. Each 
of these offenses provides for enhanced penalties if the 
offender has a prior drug-related conviction. 
 
Prior to Lynch's plea, the government had filed an 
information that charged Lynch with having been convicted 
of two state felony charges in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Bucks County, Pennsylvania. This information wasfiled 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. SS 841(b), 851(a)(1). 2 Lynch neither 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
jurisdictional defect. An appeal from a criminal judgment must be filed 
within ten days. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). The judgment and commitment 
order was entered on October 17, 1997, but the notice of appeal was 
filed with the Court on October 29, 1997, twelve days later. Lynch is 
incarcerated, and thus may file a notice of appeal pursuant to the 
provisions in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c); see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 
(1988). Through his appellate counsel, Lynch submitted to the Court a 
notarized statement verifying that he deposited the notice of appeal to 
the prison mail system on October 22, 1997, well within the 10-day 
deadline. The requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c) have been met, and 
this Court has jurisdiction over this timely filed appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a). 
 
2. 21 U.S.C. S 841(b) provides in relevant part: 
 
       . . . [A]ny person who violates subsection (a) of this section 
shall be 
       sentenced as follows: 
 
       . . . such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
       which may not be less than 10 years or more than life . . . If any 
       person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a 
felony 
       drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a 
       term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and not 
       more than life imprisonment . . . . If any person commits a 
violation 
       of this subparagraph or of section 849, 859, 860, or 861 of this 
title 
       after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense has 
       become final, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term 
       of life imprisonment without release . . . . Any sentence under 
this 
       subparagraph shall, in the absence of such a prior conviction, 
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waived nor was afforded prosecution by indictment for 
either of these two prior convictions. The district court 
enhanced Lynch's statutory sentences in light of the two 
prior convictions, resulting in an increased sentencing 
range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.3 
 
At issue in this case is the construction of the italicized 
portion of 21 U.S.C. S 851(a), which provides: 
 
       (1) No person who stands convicted of an offense under 
       this part shall be sentenced to increased punishment 
       by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless 
       before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the 
       United States attorney files an information with the 
       court . . . stating in writing the previous convictions to 
       be relied upon. . . . 
 
       (2) An information may not be filed under this section 
       if the increased punishment which may be imposed is 
       imprisonment for a term in excess of three years unless 
       the person either waived or was afforded prosecution 
       by indictment for the offense for which such increased 
       punishment may be imposed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       impose a term of supervised release of at least 5 years in addition 
       to such term of imprisonment and shall, if there was such a prior 
       conviction, impose a term of supervised release of at least 10 
years 
       in addition to such term of imprisonment. 
 
Section 841(b) also provides for doubled maximum statutory fines. 21 
U.S.C. S 851(a)(1) is reproduced in text, infra. 
 
3. The minimum sentence was increased from five to ten years; the 
maximum sentence was increased from eighty years to life 
imprisonment; the period of supervised release was increased from eight 
to sixteen years. Because the maximum sentence was increased to life 
imprisonment, Lynch's offense level was increased by three points from 
31 to 34. The applicable guideline range was 262 to 327 months after 
the enhancement, but would have been 188 to 235 months without the 
enhancement. The district court granted the government's motion made 
under U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 based on Lynch's substantial assistance and 
cooperation to authorities. The district court therefore sentenced Lynch 
to 168 months imprisonment and the mandatory minimum term of 
supervised release of 16 years. 
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Id. (italics added). This issue was not raised in the district 
court; we thus review Lynch's sentence for plain error. 
United States v. Felton, 55 F.3d 861, 869 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Lynch argues that the highlighted final clause requiring 
"indictment" refers to his prior convictions and not to the 
instant offense. In other words, Lynch believes the statute 
allows enhancements for prior convictions only if those 
prior convictions proceeded by indictment or if the 
defendant waived indictment. The government argues that 
the highlighted portion refers to the instant offense, that is, 
that 21 U.S.C. S 851(a)(2) allows enhancements for prior 
convictions no matter how charged providing the present 
offense for which the defendant is to be sentenced has been 
charged by indictment or if the right to an indictment had 
been waived. 
 
Six sister courts of appeal have passed on this precise 
issue, and all have concluded that the government's 
interpretation is the correct one. United States v. Gaitan- 
Acevedo, 148 F.3d 557, 594 (6th Cir. 1998); United States 
v. Ortiz, 143 F.3d 728, 731-32 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. 
filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. Aug. 6, 1998) (No. 98-5543), 
overruling United States v. Collado, 106 F.3d 1097 (2d Cir. 
1997); United States v. Harden, 37 F.3d 595, 600-01 (11th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Trevino-Rodriguez, 994 F.2d 
533, 536 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 
976, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Adams, 914 
F.2d 1404, 1406-07 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 617 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 
We agree with the reasoning of those cases. If we were to 
adopt Lynch's reading of the statute, we would be obliged 
to exclude many state and foreign prior convictions, which 
would be contrary to Congress's intent to broaden the 
scope of prior convictions covered by the statute. See 
Espinosa, 827 F.2d at 617. As explained by the court in 
Espinosa, 
 
       [T]he government points out the anomalous situation 
       that would result from Espinosa's interpretation. 
       Despite Congress's evident attempt in 1984 to broaden 
       the scope of S 841(b) prior convictions to include state 
       and foreign convictions (in addition to federal 
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       convictions), Espinosa's interpretation would exclude 
       from the statute's ambit prior convictions in those 
       states or foreign countries that happen to use a felony 
       complaint system rather than a grand jury indictment 
       system. 
 
Id. As the government argues, "Pennsylvania is one of those 
states [to which Espinosa refers]. There is no evidence 
whatsoever that Congress intended to exclude from 
enhanced punishment those defendants who commit 
serious drug felony offenses because of the nature of the 
charging instrument used in a particular state." Appellee's 
Br. at 6. 
 
Moreover, as stated in Ortiz, in overruling an earlier panel 
of the Second Circuit in Collado, the argument advanced by 
the defendant in Collado is not persuasive in light of new 
information adduced by the government. The Collado 
defendant had argued that the underlined language was 
surplusage if it referred to the instant offense because all 
federal felony narcotics prosecutions proceed by indictment 
or by waiver of indictment. As the Ortiz court pointed out, 
however, not all federal felony narcotics prosecutions 
proceeded by indictment when 21 U.S.C. S 851 was 
enacted: 
 
       [A]t the time S 851(a)(2) was formulated in 1970, federal 
       felony narcotics violations were prosecutable without 
       indictment in the Virgin Islands, and the Panama 
       Canal Zone. Moreover, in Guam, federal prosecutions 
       proceeded without indictment until 1968. The apparent 
       redundancy of S 851(a)(2) as applied to federal 
       prosecutions evaporates in light of this information, 
       because the provision confers a procedural safeguard 
       for offenders facing charges eligible for enhancement 
       under SS 841-45 in territorial jurisdictions where 
       federal prosecution by information is possible. 
 
        . . . [L]iberated from the apparent redundancy of the 
       statute as applied to federal prosecutions, we find it far 
       more sensible in terms of the structure and purpose of 
       the statute that the grand jury guarantee refers to the 
       instant felony offense. 
 
Ortiz, 143 F.3d at 731 (footnotes omitted). 
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In the same vein, the government points out4 that the 
present offenses to which section 851 applies (those in part 
D of Title 21, ch. 13, subch. 1) do include offenses that 
need not proceed by indictment or waiver thereof, namely 
misdemeanors under 21 U.S.C. S 844. This further bolsters 
the argument that the highlighted text is not redundant if 
it refers to the instant offense. Accordingly we, in common 
with the other courts of appeals that have been confronted 
with this argument, conclude that the italicized phrase 
reflects and is to be interpreted as congressional intent to 
include within the purview of S 851 serious recidivists as 
opposed to petty offenders charged only with 
misdemeanors. 
 
We thus hold that Lynch has not overcome the plain 
error threshold. See United States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 
1228-29 (3d Cir. 1994). Even if he had, we also hold on the 
merits that the government may file an information to 
establish prior offenses under 21 U.S.C. S 851(a)(2) 
regardless of whether the prior offenses were charged by 
indictment or whether the defendant waived indictment in 
the prior offenses. The government may file an information 
detailing prior offenses under 21 U.S.C. S 851 if the current 
offense was charged by indictment or if the defendant 
waived indictment for the current offense. 
 
We will therefore affirm the district court's order dated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The government also argues that if we were to interpret the italicized 
phrase to refer to the prior convictions and require that they be charged 
by indictment, an ex post facto problem might arise inasmuch as 
punishment may not be imposed on an earlier adjudicated offense. See 
United States v. Adams, 914 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990): 
 
       [The] offense which requires indictment or waiver thereof is "the 
       offense for which such increased punishment may be imposed." 
       Obviously the punishment for a past, prior offense cannot be 
       subsequently increased ex post facto. But the punishment for the 
       current offense in the case at bar can appropriately be enhanced 
       and made more severe because the current offense is not the 
       appellant's first violation of the criminal law, but he is a 
recidivist 
       or "repeat offender." 
 
Id. at 1407 (emphasis in original). 
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October 16, 1997, which enhanced Lynch's sentence as a 
result of his two prior convictions. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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